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Abstract
The existing literature often incorporates ad-hoc models of exogenous
real wage rigidity into search frictions models of the labour market in or-
der to match the large volatility of unemployment observed in the data.
In this paper, we develop an alternative version of the search frictions
model that incorporates insights from behavioural economics. We derive
a model in which endogenous real wage rigidity emerges from optimal
wage-setting and show that this model can match the observed volatil-
ity of unemployment. Thus our proposed model can match the data as
closely as the existing literature but without the disadvantage of assuming
exogenous and ad hoc forms of real wage rigidity.
Keywords: real wage rigidity, search frictions, behavioural economics,
unemployment volatilty puzzle
JEL Classication: E23, E32, J23, J30, J64
1 Introduction
Explaining movements of labour market variables across the business cycle has
proved to be di¢ cult. Models based around search frictions in the labour market
that use standard parameterisations of the structural parameters imply a low
volatility of unemployment and vacancies, in contrast to empirical evidence of
substantial volatility. An inuential strand of argument suggests that generating
high volatility of unemployment and vacancies requires the volatility of the
real wage to be low (eg Shimer, 2005). Real wage rigidity has proved to be
a successful way of achieving this; many authors have found that adding some
type of real wage rigidity to the standard search frictions model enables them to
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generate su¢ cient volatility in unemployment to match the data. But although
these types of real wage rigidity enable the search frictions model to match the
data, they are not microfounded in the behaviour of households or rms. We
refer to these as models of exogenous wage rigidity. In the literature, there are
four widely used representations of exogenous wage rigidity. These comprise (i)
the case of a xed real wage (eg Hall, 2005); (ii) partial adjustment of the wage
towards the bargained wage (eg Krause and Lubik, 2007, Christo¤el and Linzert,
2010, and Shimer, 2010); (iii) relating the real wage to both the bargained
wage and the steady-state value of the bargained wage (eg, Krause and Lubik,
2007, and Faia, 2008) and (iv) assuming that the wage uctuates around the
steady-state value of the bargained wage in response to the shocks that drive
the business cycle (eg, Blanchard and Gali, 2007 and Michaillait, 2012).
In this paper, we develop an alternative version of the search frictions model
that incorporates insights from behavioural economics; we refer to this as a
"behavioural search" model for simplicity. We use this model to derive four
models of optimal wage-setting by rms that closely resemble the four widely-
used representations of exogenous wage rigidity in the literature. We also show
that these models are able to match the observed volatility of unemployment
and other moments of the data. Thus our proposed model can match the data
as closely as the existing literature but without the disadvantage of assuming
exogenous and ad hoc forms of real wage rigidity.
We are not the rst to develop behavioural search models; other examples
include Danthine and Donaldson (1990), Danthine and Kurmann (2007, 2010),
Eliaz and Speigler (2013) and Kuang and Wang (2017). Our contribution is
to argue that this framework enables the derivation of models of optimal wage-
setting that resemble existing models of exogenous real wage rigidity. We do not
use our model to address the wider issue of how unemployment volatility can
best be modelled, as this is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore we do not
compare our model against alternatives such as the alternating o¤er bargaining
approach to wage determination proposed by Hall and Milgrom (2008), the
staggered wage-setting approach of Gertler and Trigari (2009), or other models
that have been proposed to address unemployment volatility.
In our model, output depends on e¤ort exerted by workers where e¤ort is
determined by workers. We assume that e¤ort a¤ects worker utility through two
o¤setting channels, a dislike of exerting e¤ort and a reciprocity e¤ect. With the
reciprocity e¤ect, the worker derives utility from responding to a generous wage
o¤er from the rm by increasing e¤ort, or from "punishing" a low wage o¤er from
the rm by reducing e¤ort; evidence for this includes Kahneman et al (1986),
Bewley (1999) and Fehr et al (2009). We model the reciprocity e¤ect, following
Rabin (1993) and Danthine and Kurmann (2007), by assuming that workers
evaluate the rms wage o¤er relative to a reference wage; this is supported by
evidence in Fehr and Falk (1999), Brown et al (2004) and Della Vigna and Pope
(2016). Using this framework, we derive an optimal supply of e¤ort function in
which e¤ort depends on the wage o¤ered by the rm relative to the workers
reference wage. In this model, e¤ort is unobservable and so cannot be the subject
of a worker-rm negotiation; this distinguishes our approach from the related
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literature (eg Gali and van Rens, 2016) in which e¤ort is determined through
a bargain. We also assume wage-posting: the rm makes a wage o¤er to the
worker; if accepted, the worker determines their level of e¤ort and production
occurs. Wages are determined through two trade-o¤s. Workers determine their
optimal supply of e¤ort by trading o¤ the costs of exerting e¤ort against the
reciprocity benet, at the margin. Firms in turn trade o¤ the cost of higher
wages against the benet of higher output. We show that the optimal wage
o¤ered by rms minimises the average cost of output through a version of the
Solow Condition (Solow, 1979), modied to reect labour market frictions. The
resultant wage is closely linked to the reference wage used by workers to evaluate
the generosity of wage o¤ers from the rm. Our optimal wage equations show
that incorporating insights from behavioural economics can give an interesting
new perspective on wage determination in which the focus is on the forces driving
the workers optimal choice of e¤ort and how the rm incorporates these into
the choice of the wage they o¤er to the worker.
Existing models of exogenous real wage rigidity incorporate the Nash bar-
gained wage. In order to obtain a similar variable in our model of behavioural
search with wage posting, we use the concept of the "fair wage". Although the
fair wage has been widely used in the literature (eg Danthine and Kurmann,
2010, Kuang and Wang, 2017), this has to date been modelled using reduced
form functions of employment and the wage; wage rigidity is obtained by in-
cluding the lagged wage in the reduced form representation of the fair wage. We
instead derive an endogenous representation of the fair wage by assuming that
workers feel entitled to at least a minimum share of the surplus from their job
match. This fair wage resembles the Nash bargained wage but has a sharply
di¤erent interpretation, consistent with a model of wage posting. We obtain
our four models of optimal wage-setting by assuming that the reference wage is
either (i) xed (giving a wage equation similar to Hall (2005); (ii) a function of
the fair wage and the lagged wage (giving a wage equation similar to Krause and
Lubik, 2007, Christo¤el and Linzert, 2010, and Shimer, 2010); (iii) a function
of the fair wage and the average value of the fair wage (in which case the wage
equation is similar to Faia, 2008); or (iv) a function of the steady-state value
of the fair and productivity shocks, giving a wage equation that is similar to
Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Michaillait (2012).
In models of exogenous wage rigidity, the intuition for uctuations in unem-
ployment across the business cycle is simple and follows Hall (2005). In response
to a positive productivity shock, rms post an increased number of vacancies,
resulting in increased labour market tightness and a reduction in unemploy-
ment. In response to a negative shock, rms post fewer vacancies, resulting in
an increase in unemployment and a reduced marginal cost of hiring. Through
this mechanism, sharp movements in unemployment across the business cycle
are generated and thus the model can generate a large unemployment volatility.
This process is stronger when wages are less responsive to the business cycle, as
highlighted by Shimer (2005) in his interpretation of the unemployment volatlil-
ity puzzle. A similar intuition applies with the behavioural search model. Since
the wage equations we obtain exhibit substantial real wage rigidity, rms again
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respond to a positive productivity shock by posting an increased number of va-
cancies, leading to a reduction in unemployment. Thus, these wage equations
also imply a large volatility of unemployment. A key feature of our optimal wage
equations is the presence of extensive wage rigidity. This arises because the ref-
erence wage has a low volatility across the business cycle. We argue that there
is no mechanism in behavioural search models that implies a stable reference
wage and hence there is nothing intrinsic in behavioural models that generates
wage rigidity. Rather, our argument for a stable reference wage is empirical.
We argue that there is substantial evidence of a stable reference wage, including
Koenig et al (2017), Gneezy and List (2006), Crawford and Meng (2011) and
Wadhwani and Wall (1991).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2), we document models of
exogenous real wage rigidity that have been used in the literature. Section 3)
then outlines the standard search frictions model and highlights the mechanism
through which unemployment volatility is generated. In section 4), we develop
our alternative behavioural search model and discuss how alternative relation-
ships between the reference wage and the fair wage imply wage equations that
resemble existing models of exogenous real wage rigidity. Section 5) discusses
calibration of our model and presents our simulation results. Section 6) con-
cludes by suggesting avenues for future research.
2 Exogenous Real Wage Rigidity in the Litera-
ture
We can classify approaches to real wage rigidity in the existing literature into
four main types. The rst type, introduced by Hall (2005), simply assumes a
xed real wage, so
wt = w (1)
where wt is the real wage. Hall (2005) motivates this approach by noting that
any outcome within the bargaining set is a potential equilibrium and arguing
that a xed wage that lies within this set can be sustained through a social
norm. However, as noted by Kennan (2009), there is no theory of social norms
and so the wage equation in (1) is not fully microfounded1 . The second type,
used by Krause and Lubik (2007), Christo¤el and Linzert (2010) and Shimer
(2010), assumes that wages reect Nash bargaining and uses the lagged wage to
capture rigidity, so
wt = wt 1 + (1  )wNasht (2)
where wNasht is the real wage obtained through Nash bargaining and  is a
measure of real wage rigidity. The literature has generally assumed substantial
1Kennan (2009) derives a xed real wage using a model where productivity, which can be
either high or low, is observed by the rm but not the worker. This mechanism requires a
richer theoretical framework than the standard search frictions model.
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rigidity: Krause and Lubik (2007) use  = 1, while Christo¤el and Linzert (2010)
and Shimer (2010) assume  = 0:92 . This wage equation is not microfounded3 .
The third type of real wage rigidity, introduced by Krause and Lubik (2007)
and Faia (2008), takes a similar approach by assuming
wt = w
Nash + (1  )wNasht (3)
where wNash is the steady-state value of the bargained wage. Krause and Lubik
(2007) assume  = 1. Faia (2008) assumes  = 0:6, as do more recent contri-
butions such as Albertini and Fairise (2013) and Torrachi (2017). The fourth
main type, introduced by Blanchard and Gali (2007), models the cyclicality of
the real wage using
wt = w
Nashs
1 1
t (4)
where st is a productivity shock (which drives movements in output in this
model) and 1 is an alternative measure of real wage rigidity. Blanchard and
Gali (2007) and Michaillat (2014) assume 1 = 0:5, while Michaillat (2012)
assumes 1 = 0:3 and Kohlbrecher (2016) assume 1 = 0:2.
3 A Simple Search Model
In this section, we briey discuss the standard search frictions model without
behavioural e¤ects and discuss why wage rigidity implies an increased volatility
of unemployment. We use a discrete time model. Within a time period, rst
shocks are realised and then hiring occurs. After this, wages are determined,
then production occurs followed by exogenous separation. If there is no agree-
ment about the wage, the worker is unemployed for the remainder of period and
the rm has an unlled vacancy. A job match dissolves at the end of the period
with exogenous probability  .
3.1 The Labour Market
The labour market is characterised by search frictions. Aggregate hiring is
determined by the matching function
ht = mu

t v
1 
t (5)
where h is the number of workers hired, u is the unemployment rate and v is the
vacancy rate. m and  are parameters characterising the matching function.
2Abbritti and Weber (2008) assume  = 0:5, while Merkl (2009) assumes  = 0:6. In a
recent constribution, Leduc and Liu (2017) assume  = 0:95.
3Gali and van Rens (2014) motivate a generalisation of (2) given by wt = twt 1 + (1  
t)w
Nash
t , where t is a function of the distance between the wage and the boundaries of the
bargaining set, by assuming that the wage is xed with the bargaining set but adjusted to the
Nash wage if the xed wage hits the boundaries of the bargaining set.
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Dening labour market tightness as
t =
vt
ut
(6)
the matching function can also be written as
ht = mut
1 
t (7)
The vacancy lling rate, the probability of a rm lling a vacancy, is
qt =
ht
vt
= m t (8)
while the job nding rate, the probability that an unemployed worker nds a
job is
ft =
ht
ut
= tqt (9)
3.2 Workers
There is a continuum of identical workers on the unit interval. In period t a
worker is either employed or unemployed. If employed, the worker earns (and
consumes) real wage wt; if unemployed, they receive the opportunity cost of
employment z, reecting unemployment benets and the ow value of non-work
activities. An employed worker becomes unemployed in the next period with
exogenous probability  . An unemployed worker nds a job and is employed in
the next period with probability ft+1, where f is exogenous to the worker but
endogenous to the model. The value functions for employed and unemployed
workers are
Lt = wt +
1
1 + r
Et[(1  )Lt+1 + Ut+1] (10)
and
Ut = z +
1
1 + r
Et[ft+1Lt+1 + (1  ft+1)Ut+1] (11)
3.3 Firms
There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Each rm can hire
up to one worker. The production function is
yt = st (12)
where st = e"
s
t is a technology shock; we assume "st = 
s"st 1 + 
s
t where 
s
t is
distributed as N(0; 2s). The value function of a lled job is
Jt = yt   wt + 1
1 + r
Et[(1  )Jt+1 + Vt+1] (13)
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where V is the value function of a vacant job, given by
Vt =   + 1
1 + r
Et[qt+1Jt+1 + (1  qt+1)Vt+1] (14)
Firms must pay a real cost of  to post a vacancy. Vacancies are then lled at
the start of the next period with probability q4 .
We assume free entry of rms, so Vt = 0. This implies that the value function
for vacancies simplies to
Jt = (1 + r)

qt
(15)
and so the value function for a lled job becomes
(1 + r)

qt
= yt   wt + (1  ) 
Etqt+1
(16)
or
yt = wt + t (17)
where t =

mf(1 + r)t   (1  )Ett+1g is the real cost of hiring a worker.
3.4 The Sources of Unemployment Volatility
The rms optimality condition in (17) implies
@wt
@yt
+
@t
@yt
= 1 (18)
The impact of productivity shocks on unemployment volatility can be under-
stood through this relationship. Consider the extreme case in which the wage is
xed, as in Hall (2008). In response to a positive productivity shock, rms post
an increased number of vacancies, resulting in increased labour market tightness
and a reduction in unemployment; this results in an increased marginal cost of
hiring, satisfying (18). In response to a negative shock, rms post fewer vacan-
cies, resulting in an increase in unemployment and a reduced marginal cost of
hiring, again satisfying (18). Through this mechanism, a xed real wage leads
to sharp movements in unemployment across the business cycle and thus the
model can generate a large unemployment volatility.
The amount of unemployment volatility generated by the model is smaller
the more responsive the wage is to productivity shocks, as the model then re-
quires weaker uctuations in unemployment in order to satisfy (18). This is why
the models reviewed in section 2) require substantial amounts of wage rigidity
in order to generate empirically plausible levels of unemployment volatility. The
role of wage adjustment in reducing unemployment volatility is also highlighted
4As we discuss below, we numerically solve and then simulate our model. The assumption
that vacancy that is matched to a worker becomes immediately productive ensures the model
satises the Blanchard-Khan condition.
7
in the case where the wage is determined through Nash bargaining. Here, the
wage can be expressed as (e.g. Mortensen and Nagypal, 2007)
wNasht = (yt + Ett+1) + (1  )z (19)
where  is the relative bargaining power of workers. In this case it is well
known that wages are highly responsive to productivity shocks. The strong
responsiveness of wages to productivity shocks, implies, through (18), a small
adjustment of the marginal cost of hiring; which implies only a mild volatility
of unemployment. This is the underlying cause of the "unemployment volatility
puzzle" highlighted by Shimer (2005).
4 A Behavioural Search Model
In this section we construct our behavioural search model and use this to de-
rive a series of optimal wage equations that are similar to the existing models
of exogenous wage rigidity outlined in section 2). Our model incorprates two
non-standard elements into an otherwise standard search frictions model. First,
output depends on e¤ort exerted by workers, where the optimal supply of ef-
fort is determined by the worker. Second, wages are set by rms, rather than
being determined through worker-rm bargaining. These modelling choices are
motivated by insights from the behavioral economics literature, supported by
empirical evidence. We now briey summarise these.
First, considering e¤ort, Williamson (1985) and Hart and Moore (2008) ar-
gue that employment contracts are inherently incomplete since only a minimum
level of job performance can be legally enforced. As a result, workers have
discretion over the amount of e¤ort they devote to the job. The e¤ort sup-
plied by workers is often modelled as depending on a workers perception of
the fairness of the wage o¤ered by the rm, where the fairness of a wage o¤er
is evaluated relative to a workers reference wage. The relationship between
e¤ort and fairness is motivated by reciprocity; this idea was the basis of the
"gift exchange" variant of e¢ ciency wage theory proposed by Akerlof (1982)
and Akerlof and Yellen (1990); these e¤ects were introduced into the business
cycle literature by Danthine and Donaldson (1990). The role of the reference
wage was stressed by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), who relate this to the
concept of reference dependent preferences (see also Della Vigna, 2009). Using
this concept, reciprocity and reference wages were introduced to game theory
by Rabin (1993), whose approach was used by Danthine and Kurmann (2007)
to derive a macroeconomic relationship between e¤ort and wages.
There is a large empirical literature documenting the importance of these
e¤ects (summarised in Della Vigna, 2009, and Fehr, 2009). Laboratory studies
supporting fairness e¤ects include Fehr and Falk (1999), who nd wages above
the competitive level, sustained by reciprocal high levels of worker e¤ort, in the
context of an experimental labour market in which rms cannot monitor e¤ort.
Camerer (2003) nds frequent rejection of outcomes perceived as being unfair
within the ultimatum game; similar evidence is obtained by Brown et al (2004),
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although in this study a sizeable minority of participants do not exhibit such
pro-social behaviour. Beyond the laboratory, Kreuger and Mas (2004) document
how attempts by major US tyre producers to reduce the wage were perceived
as unfair and led to a sharp reduction on the quality of output. Other examples
include Gneezy and List (2006), who nd that higher paid workers input data
into a library information system more rapidly and Cohn et al (2014) who
found that workers were productive in distributing free newspapers when they
perceived their wages as fair.
Further support for the importance of these e¤ects comes from outside the
behavioural literature. A number of studies have analysed the responses of
rms to questions about the determinants of wages using data derived from a
series of surveys conducted at di¤erent dates in a number of di¤erent countries.
These include Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1999), Campbell and Kamlani
(1997) and Levine (1993) for the US, Galuµcák et al (2012) for 15 EU countries,
Millard and Tatomir (2015) for the UK and Agell and Lundborg (2003) for
Sweden. These studies nd that rms consistently cite the adverse impact on
the e¤ort of workers as a primary reason for not reducing wages when their
economic environment deteriorates.
Second, considering wage posting, Hall and Kreuger (2012) note that there
are two main approaches to wage determination in search frictions models, wage
posting, in which rms make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to workers, and wage bar-
gaining. Hall and Kreuger (2012) also note that although wage posting is as-
sociated with models of directed search, "the assumption of a posted wage in a
model with random search would not be unreasonable".
There are two studies of the incidence of di¤erent types of wage setting. Hall
and Kreuger (2012) study responses of 1400 workers to survey questions on the
circumstances in which they took their most recent job. In total, only 31% of
workers reported some type of wage bargaining. This proportion is larger for
professional and knowledge-based occupations. It is also much larger for workers
engaged in on-the-job-search. Brenzel et al (2014) examine the responses of over
9,000 rms to the recurrent German Job Vacancy Survey and nd similar results.
They nd that only 38% of rms report wage bargaining; this proportion falls
to 27% in industries covered by a collective wage agreement and to 32% when
an unemployed worker is hired. Wage bargaining is much more likely when
the job opening requires an experienced and more highly skilled worker. These
studies reveal a good deal of diversity in wage-setting. But it is clear that
wage bargaining is not common, especially in the type of hiring consistent with
the standard search frictions model: hiring to occupations where there is no
di¤erence in productivity between workers and where newly-hired workers come
from unemployment rather than an alternative employer.
However, as Hall and Kreuger (2012) stress, this is not inconsistent with
the alternating o¤er bargaining protocol of Hall and Milgrom (2008) where the
rst o¤er made in a negotiation, assumed to come from the rm, is always
accepted. But evidence in Galuµcák et al (2012) argues against alternating o¤er
wage bargaining. Galuµcák et al (2012) examine responses of Chief Executive
O¢ cers or Human Resource Managers of around 15,000 rms to a rm-level
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survey on wage- and price-setting practices in 15 EU countries, conducted under
the auspices of the European Central Bank. They nd that wages o¤ered to
newly-hired workers are more strongly a¤ected by wages o¤ered within the rm
than by wages on the wider labour market (the relative weights on internal
and external factors are roughly 4:1); similar evidence is found in Levine (1993)
and other papers that examine the role of internal and external factors in wage
setting. This goes against alternating o¤er bargaining, where the wage is driven
by external factors.
Given this evidence, we assume wage posting in our model with undirected
search, in contrast to almost all of the existing literature that uses a wage
bargaining framework. Two issues arise. First, why do rms choose not to
bargain with workers? Empirical evidence in Galuµcák et al (2012) sugests a
possible reason. They nd that only 16% of rms would consider o¤ering newly
hired workers a higher wage in a tight labour market (and only 13% would
consider o¤ering a lower wage in a loose labour market); the reasons cited for
not doing so include the adverse impact on the e¤ort of incumbent workers, the
impact on the reputation of the rm and the presence of collective agreements
with the workforce. Thus, many rms do not bargain over wages with newly-
hired workers as they are unwilling to o¤er a wage di¤erent from the going wage
within the rm because this would reduce the productivity of existing workers.
Second, why does the Diamond Paradox, whereby wages are driven down to
the workers reservation wage, not apply? In our model, as we show below,
it is optimal for rms to o¤er a wage that exceeds the reference wage, so the
Diamond Paradox is not applicable in this case.
4.1 Optimal E¤ort
We amend the value function of an employed worker to be
Lt = wt   c(et) +R(et; wt) + 1
1 + r
Et[(1  )Lt+1 + Ut+1] (20)
where c(et) is the disutility of exerting e¤ort and R(et; wt) is utility gained from
reciprocity. We follow Rabin (1993) and Danthine and Kurmann (2007) by
assuming that
R(et; wt) = g(wt)d(et) (21)
where g(wt) is the workers perception of the wage o¤er of the rm and d(et) is
the workers reciprocal response. In this specication, the specication of g(wt)
captures how workers view the o¤er of a wage wt by the rm and d(et) captures
how they respond to this through a willingness to exert e¤ort. Thus, if workers
perceive a wage o¤er as generous, they reciprocate through a greater willingess
to exert e¤ort.
Workers determine their optimal supply of e¤ort to maximise the value func-
tion in (20); the optimal level of e¤ort satises
ce(et) = de(et)g(wt) (22)
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We assume c(et) =
!e1+'t
1+' and d(et) =
e1+t
1+ ; the optimal supply of e¤ort is then
et = 1g(wt)
 (23)
where  = 1'  and 1 = (

! )
.
We follow the literature in assuming that workers evaluate the rms wage
o¤er relative to a reference wage wreft , so g(wt) = (
wt wreft
w wref ), where (w wref ) is
the di¤erential of the wage over the reference wage in steady-state. The optimal
e¤ort function is
et = 1(
wt   wreft
w   wref )
 (24)
This simple e¤ort function has two interesting properties. First, a similar e¤ort
function was estimated in Della Vigna and Pope (2016), providing an estimate
of  that can be used in calibrating the model; this estimate is small. Second,
wreft acts as a form of reservation wage as workers will not exert positive e¤ort
for a lower wage.
4.2 The Optimal Wage
To accomodate endogenous e¤ort and wage posting, we amend the sequence of
events within a time period. After shocks are realised, hiring occurs. Then the
rm posts a wage; if the worker accepts this o¤er, they become employed and
determine the amount of e¤ort to expend. Production then occurs followed by
exogenous separation. If the worker does not accept the wage o¤er, they are
unemployed for the remainder of period and the rm has an unlled vacancy.
We amend the production function to be
yt = stet (25)
where et is the amount of e¤ort exerted by the worker and  = ( ! )
  is a
constant, set to ensure output equals unity in steady-state.
The rm will choose the wage to maximise the value of a lled job, given by
Jt = Et
1X
k=0
(
1  
1 + r
)k(st+ket+k   wt+k) (26)
The optimality condition is
stew;t = 1 (27)
where ew;t is the derivative of e¤ort with respect to the wage. In setting the
wage, the rms trades o¤ the impact of a higher wage on the wage bill against
the benet of higher e¤ort, at the margin. Writing the optimality condition for
the wage as
"e;w =
wt
yt
(28)
where "e;w is the elasticity of e¤ort with respect to the wage. This is a version of
the classic Solow (1979) condition, adapted to a search frictions context. From
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(19), the wage is less than output because of search costs and so "e;w < 1 (in the
absence of search frictions, we obtain the original Solow Condition, "e;w = 1).
Thus e¤ort and the wage are higher than in the original Solow model, as a result
of search frictions. Noting that "e;w =  wtwt wreft
, the optimal wage is
wt = w
ref
t + yt (29)
Using (17) to substitute output then gives
wt =
1
1  w
ref
t +

1  t (30)
This wage equation shows that incorporating insights from behavioural eco-
nomics gives an interesting new perspective on wage determination in which the
focus is on the forces driving the workers optimal choice of e¤ort and how the
rm incorporates these into the choice of the wage they o¤er to the worker. The
rms o¤ers workers a wage that is a mark-up over the reference wage and also
depends on labour market search frictions, embedded in the marginal cost of
hiring. We note that with this wage equation, the wage exceeds the reference
wage, in contrast to some inuential studies such as Kahneman et al (1986).
4.3 The Fair Wage
The models of exogenous real wage rigidity in section 2) feature the Nash bar-
gained wage. In this section we outline how we obtain similar relationships in
our behavioural search model where wages are determined through wage posting
by rms rather than through worker-rm bargaining. The behavioural litera-
ture has stressed the importance of the "fair wage", although this has tended
to be modelled as being exogenous. We develop a simple endogenous model of
the fair wage, where we interpret this as the minimum wage to which workers
feel entitled. To be specic, we assume that workers feel entitled to at least a
minimum share of the surplus generated by a job match. Denoting the surplus
generated by an employed workers job match as S, we assume that the worker
feels entitled to at least a minimum share  of this surplus. This implies 5
(Lt   Ut) = St (31)
Denoting the minimum wage to which the worker feels entitled to as wfairt , then
wfairt = (yt + Ett+1) + (1  )z (32)
This appears similar to the Nash bargained wage in (19) but has a markedly
di¤erent interpretation. wfair is not the wage; it is a workers perception of the
5For simplicity, this uses the value function for employed workers in (10) rather than in
(20), so workers calculate the fair wage without reference to e¤ort. In practice, this makes
little di¤erence since simulations of our model, reported below, show that c(:)  R(:) is close
to zero and our small calibrated value for  implies that c(:) and d(:) are highly unresponsive
to the wage.
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lowest wage to which they feel entitled. If the reference wage is the minimum
wage to which the worker feels entitled, so
wreft = w
fair
t (33)
then the optimal wage o¤ered by rms is
wt =
1
1  w
fair
t +

1  t (34)
Since  is small, the main driver of the wage in (34) is the "fair wage". Since
the fair wage will be strongly cyclical unless the workers entitled share of the
surplus, , is calibrated to be small, this simple model is unable to generate
a large volatility of unemployment. This highlights the fact that there is no
mechanism in behavioural search models that leads to wage rigidity and hence
there is nothing intrinsic in behavioural models that generates a large volatility
of unemployment.
4.4 Optimal Wage Equations With Endogenous Rigidity
We next explore alternative specications of the reference wage that lead to
wage equations with endogenous real wage rigidity that resemble the exogenous
wage rigidity models in Section 2). These alternative specications are based on
a similar idea; that the reference wage has a low volatility across the business
cycle.
This assumption is supported by empirical evidence that the reference wage
has low volatility across the business cycle. Koenig et al (2017) analyse longitu-
dinal micro data on the lowest wage at which workers would take a job, taken
from the British Household Panel Survey, covering 1991-2009, and the German
Socio Economic Panel, covering 1984-2010. They argue that this variable cannot
be interpreted as the reservation wage, the wage at which workers are indi¤erent
between employment and unemployment, as its volatility is much lower than
the highly volatile reservation wage. They instead provide a more behavioural
interpretation that corresponds closely to the concept of the reference wage. In
the light of this, we can use this evidence on the cyclicality of this reservation
wage as being informative about how the reference wage varies across the busi-
ness cycle. Koenig et al (2017) nd that this variable is slightly less volatile than
the actual wage in the UK and almost three time less volatile than the wage
in Germany. They also estimate that the elasticity of this wage with respect
to unemployment is small. We can therefore interpret this evidence as showing
that the reference wage has low volatility across the business cycle. Other ev-
idence suggestive of a low volatility of the reference wage includes Wadhwani
and Wall (1991), who nd evidence of partial adjustment of reference wages in
estimated wage equations using UK rm-level data, Gneezy and List (2006),
who nd adaptation of reference wages in response to changes in the actual
wage in their study of library workers, and the study of the behaviour of New
York cab drivers in Crawford and Meng (2011).
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From this empirical evidence, we infer that the reference wage has low volatil-
ity across the business cycle and frame our modelling of this variable accordingly.
In doing so, we follow authors such as Eliaz and Speigler (2013), who develop
a model in which e¤ort takes one of two values, and Kuang and Wang (2017),
who follow Danthine and Kurmann (2007) in expressing e¤ort as a reduced form
function of wages and employment. Although we take a similar approach, we
di¤er from Eliaz and Speigler (2013) by assuming that e¤ort is continuous rather
than binary and di¤er from Kuang and Wang (2017) in developing a model of
the fair wage in order to derive wage equations that resemble those in section
2).
4.4.1 A Fixed Fair Wage
We rst consider the case where
wreft = w
fair (35)
so the reference wage is the steady-state value of the fair wage; here, workers
view a wage o¤er that exceeds the normal value of the fair wage as generous.
The optimal wage o¤ered by rms is
wt =
1
1  w
fair +

1  t (36)
Recalling that econometric estimates of  are small, this wage equation is similar
to the real wage equation proposed by Hall (2005), in (1). This wage equation
exhibits substantial real wage rigidity, consistent with empirical evidence of
a low volatility of the reference wage. Therefore rms respond to a positive
productivity shock by posting an increased number of vacancies. This implies a
reduction in unemployment and an increased marginal cost of hiring. Thus, this
wage equation implies a large volatility of unemployment, generated through the
mechanism highlighted by Hall (2005).
4.4.2 An Adaptative Fair Wage
The experimental literature on fair wages and e¤ort has found that workers
reference wages adjust to changes in the wage (Kahneman et al, 1986, Fehr et
al, 2009, Cohn et al, 2014). In addition, Koenig et al (2017) argue that their
reservation wage measure is inuenced by a workers labour market history. To
capture these adaptation e¤ects, we next assume that the reference wage is
wreft = (1 $)wfairt +$wt 1 (37)
With this specication, workers respond to a higher wage than normal by in-
creasing the wage to which they feel entitled. The implied wage is
wt =
(1 $)
1   w
fair
t +
$
1  wt 1 +

1  t (38)
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This is similar to the wage equation in (2), used by Krause and Lubik (2007),
Christo¤el and Linzert (2010) and Shimer (2010). Evidence of a low cyclicality
of the reference wage suggests a relatively large value for $, enabling the model
to generate a large unemployment volatility through a similar mechanism to the
case of the xed fair wage.
4.4.3 An Adjustable Fair Wage
Alternatively, a wage equation similar to those used by Faia (2008), Albertini
and Fairise (2013) and Torrachi (2017) can be obtained if
wreft = $w
fair + (1 $)wfairt (39)
The optimal wage is
wt =
(1 $)
1   w
fair
t +
$
1  w
fair +

1  t (40)
which is similar to (3). This wage equation can also generate a large volatility
of unemployment, through a similar mechanism, if $ is large.
4.4.4 A Cyclical Fair Wage
Finally, we consider the case where
wreft = w
fairs1 $1t (41)
where $1 measures how the reference wage varies around the normal fair wage
across the business cycle. Here, a wage o¤er that exceeds the cyclically adjusted
fair wage is seen as generous. The optimal wage is then
wt =
1
1  w
fairs1 $1t +

1  t (42)
This is similar to (4), the wage equation used by Blanchard and Gali (2007)
and Michaillat (2012, 2014). This model can generate a large volatility of un-
employment if $1 is su¢ ciently large.
5 Simulation Results
In this section we present simulation evidence to complement the analysis in
previous sections. We calibrate the model, as discussed below. The model com-
prisises the equations for labour market dynamics in (5)-(9), the production
function in (12) (for the exogenous search model) or (25) (for the behavioural
search model), the optimality condition in (17), and either the equation for the
Nash bargained wage in (19) and one of the exogenous wage wage in section
2) (for exogenous rigidity); or the e¤ort function in (24), the fair wage in (32)
and one of the behaviour search wage equations in section 4.4). This model is
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linearised and solved numerically; it is then simulated and key statistics gener-
ated.
We do a series of pairwise comparisons of the four variants of the exogenous
wage rigidity model with the corresponding variant of the behaviour search
model. Thus we compare the model that uses the xed wage equation in (1)
with the model implied by the xed fair wage equation in (36); we compare the
model implied by (2) with the model implied by the adaptive fair wage equation
in (38), and so on. We also compare the model implied by Nash wage bargaining
without wage rigidity with the model implied by the fair wage equation in (34).
5.1 Calibration Strategy
We normalize a time period to be one month. We calibrate our parameters
using widely used values in the existing literature. The discount rate is set as
r = 0:42%, equivalent to an annual discount rate of 5%. We follow Hall and
Milgrom (2008) and assume that the average opportunity cost of employment is
z = 0:71. Chodrow-Reich and Karabarounis (2016) report a range of empirical
estimates of the opportunity cost of employment, between 0:47 and 0:96, based
on alternative specications of the ow value of non-work; the mid-point of this
range is also z = 0:71. For the matching function, we set  = 0:4; this is the mid-
point of the range of estimates obtained by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
We calibrate the remaining structural parameters to hit a series of calibration
targets, outlined in Table 2). We target the persistence and volatility of US
productivity growth for 1951-2004 as reported in Hagedorn and Mankovskii
(2008); to meet these targets, we set s = 0:765 and s = 0:0084. We also target
u = 0:059; the average value of the US unemployment rate, 1948-2016, and
 = 0:72, the value for average labour market tightness reported by Pissarides
(2009). For the model with exogenous wage rigidity, we calibrate the bargaining
power of workers to meet the target for the average rate of unemployment. This
gives  = 0:482. We then calibrate  so that the model matches  = 0:716.
This gives  = 0:38; this value lies in the range of calibrated values of  in
the literature6 . We calibrate the monthly job separation rate as  = 0:0367 .
Since fu = (1  u), our values for  and u imply the average job-nding rate
is f = 0:573; this is close to Shimer (2005b)s estimate of f = 0:594. We then
calibrate m to satisfy the relationship f = m; for these values of f and ; this
implies m = 0:70.
For the behavioural search model, we retain the calibrated parameters above,
with the exception of . The key parameter in this model is the elasticity of
the e¤ort function, . To calibrate this we use estimates of an e¤ort function
similar to (24) in Della Vigna and Pope (2016). Della Vigna and Pope (2016)
use data on the behaviour of 10,000 participants in an experiment using the
6The value of  is contentious. Shimer (2005) uses a quarterly vacancy cost of 0.213.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) use a weekly vacancy cost of 0:584. Hall (2005) assumes a
monthly cost of 0:986 while Pissarides (2009) assumes 0:356.
7 In the literature, monthly values of  vary between 0.03 (Hall and Milgrom, 2008) and
0.036 (Pissarides, 2009).
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Mechanical Turk platform. They estimate a very low elasticity of the e¤ort
function. Based on their estimates, we calibrate  = 0:02. We follow Danthine
and Kurmann (2010) in setting the elasticity of d(et) to 1 +  = 0:75; this
implies  =  0:25. These calibrated values for , and  imply ' = 49:75. We
set ! = 0:755 and  = 0:0093. Although there are no prior studies or other
evidence to guide our calibrations of these parameters, the simulated volatilities
are not sensitive to the specic values chosen. With this calibration, the utility
cost of e¤ort and the utility benets of reciprocation are equal to 1:5% and 1:2%
respectively of output in steady-state. We set  = 1:092 to ensure output equals
unity in steady-state. Given these, we calibrate  to match the average value of
unemployment in US data, similar to the calibration of . Doing so results in
 = 0:423. The fact that this is slightly lower than the calibrated value of  is
consistent with our model since  is the share of the surplus workers are able to
obtain, while  is the smallest share of the surplus to which they feel entitled.
Our calibrated parameter values are summarised in Table 1).
Table 1 Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
s Persistence of Supply Shock 0:765
s Volatility of Supply Shock 0:0084
 Separation Rate 0:036
r Discount Rate 0:0042
z Average Opportunity Cost of Employment 0:71
 Vacancy Cost 0:38
m Matching Coe¢ cient 0:7
 Matching Elasticity 0:4
 Wage bargaining Power of Workers 0:482
 Entitlement Share of Workers 0:423
 Elasticity of e(:) 0:02
' Elasticity of d(:) 49:74
 Elasticity of c(:)  0:25
! Cost of E¤ort Function 0:755
 Reciprocity Function 0:0093
 Production Function 1:092
With these calibrations, both the exogenous wage rigidity and the behav-
ioural search models match our calibration targets closely; see Table 2).
Table 2 Calibration Targets
(i) (ii) (iii)
Parameter Interpretation U.S Data Exog. Rigidity Behav. Search
s Volatility of US Productivity Growth 0:013 0:013 0:013
s Persistence of US Productivity Growth 0:765 0:765 0:765
 Average Labour Market Tightness 0:72 0:716 0:722
u Average Unemployment Rate 0:059 0:059 0:059
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5.2 Simulation Results
We assess our models through their ability to match the volatilities of unem-
ployment, labour market tightness and vacancies and the correlations between
unemployment and vacancies and between unemployment and labour market
tightness, as reported by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) for the US, 1951-
20048 . These are detailed in the rst row of Table 3). Row (2a) present results
for the case where the wage is equal to the Nash bargained wage in (19), while
row (2b) presents results for the case where the reference wage equals the fair
wage, in (34). The results are very similar. Neither model comes close to match-
ing the volatilities of unemployment vacancies and labour market tightness in
US data. The correlations between these variables are essentially the same in
both models. The correlation between unemployment and labour market tight-
ness comes quite close to matching the correlation in the data; the correlation
between unemployment and vacancies is strongly negative but does not match
the observed value9 . The relative failure of the model where wages are set
through Nash bargaining has been familiar since Shimer (2005). The failure of
the model where wages are equal to the fair wage is more novel. It highlights the
argument that there is nothing intrinsic in behavioural models that generates
the level of wage rigidity that is required for a model to match the data.
Rows (3a) and (3b) presents results for the models where the wage is xed,
as in (1), and for the behavioural search model with a xed reference wage, as
in (36). Both models are able to match observed volatilities closely, especially
for labour market tightness and unemployment. The results in row (3a) are
not surprising, as they essentially repeats the ndings of Hall (2005). However
the results for the behavioural search model in row (3b) are more novel; they
demonstrate that a behavioural search model can match the data as well as
existing models of exogenous wage rigidity10 . The correlations between the
variables are again very similar to each other and to the correlations in row (2).
These correlations reect Beveridge Curve mechanisms that generate a negative
correlation between unemployment and the other variables. These mechanisms
8 In doing so, we choose to assess these alternative models in terms of their ability to match
labour market data. Several of the models discussed in section 2) have a wider focus and
consider the impact of the models on wider macroeconomic issues, for example the discussion
in Krause and Lubik (2007) on the in ability of this type of mode to generate a realistic
Phillips Curve trade-o¤ between output and ination. These interesting issues are beyond the
scope of this paper
9The correlations between productivity shocks and unemployment and vacancies are similar
for all the pairs of models that we consider. The simulated correlations are larger than the
correlations observed in the data; this is a well-known shortcoming of search frictions models.
10The ability of the model in (1) to generate unemployment volatility has been interpreted
by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) in terms of a small value of the "Fundamental Surplus".
A similar argument can be used to explain why (36) also generates a large unemployment
volatility. Since the rm sets the wage, the fundamental surplus is FS = y w. As the wage
can be written as w = wfair+y, the rms optimality condition can be written as (1 )y =
wfair + . Implicitly di¤erentiating this and using the denition of the fundamental surplus,
we obtain ";y =
1 

y
y w or ";y =
1 

y
FS
where ";y is the elasticity of labour market
tightness with respect to output. Our calibration implies a small value for the Fundamental
Surplus.
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reect the ows of workers into unemployment following job separation and out
of unemployment as a result of a job match. These ows are modelled using
the assumed constant rate of job separation and the matching function. The
parameters of these are common to all the models we consider. The alternative
wage equations in rows (2) and (3) do not a¤ect the dynamic worker ows that
underlie the Beveridge Curve mechanism, leading to the same correlations being
generated by the di¤erent models.
Rows (4a) and (4b) present results for the models of partial wage adjustment
in (2) and in (38). For (2), we use  = 0:9 to calibrate the degree of wage rigidity.
The model in (2) is less able to match the data as the volatilities are lower. For
the endogenous search model in (38), we use the same degree of rigidity as in
(2) and so calibrate $ = 0:9. The results are similar. The correlations are also
similar in rows (4a) and (4b); they are slightly di¤erent to the other models
as the dynamics of the wage adjustment process interact with the dynamics of
worker ows. Rows (5a) and (5b) present results for the models of partial wage
adjustment in (3) and in (40). For (3), we again use  = 0:9 to calibrate the
degree of wage rigidity and assume the same for the behavioural search model
in (29), so $ = 0:9. These models give similar results and are able to match the
volatilities well, although they are somewhat smaller than in row (3), reecting
the lesser degree of wage rigidity. The correlations are similar to those in rows
(2)-(3). Finally, rows (6a) and (6b) present results for the models of partial
wage adjustment in (4) and (42), where we use  = $ = 0:9. Again, these
models give similar results and are able to match the volatilities well.
In summary, Table 3) shows that models derived from a behavioural search
model give similar results to widely-used models of exogenous wage rigidity in
the literature, as they imply similar volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and
labour market tightness and similar correlations between these variables. Thus
our proposed model can match the data as closely as the existing literature but
without the disadvantage of assuming exogenous and ad hoc forms of real wage
rigidity.
Table 3 Simulation Results
Wage Equation u v  u;v u;
(1) US Data 0:123 0:139 0:259  0:919  0:977
(2a) (19) 0:047 0:029 0:047  0:696  0:894
(2b) (34) 0:025 0:034 0:054  0:696  0:894
(3a) (1) 0:119 0:162 0:259  0:696  0:894
(3b) (36) 0:117 0:160 0:256  0:696  0:894
(4a) (2)  = 0:9 0:043 0:079 0:111  0:633  0:837
(4b) (38) $ = 0:9 0:042 0:077 0:109  0:632  0:835
(5a) (3)  = 0:9 0:095 0:130 0:207  0:696  0:894
(5b) (40) $ = 0:9 0:096 0:130 0:203  0:696  0:894
(6a) (4)  = 0:9 0:107 0:146 0:222  0:696  0:894
(6b) (42) $ = 0:9 0:106 0:144 0:223  0:696  0:894
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted to unify the diverse literature on real wage
rigidity in models with search frictions using a behavioural search framework
in which rms post wages and workers decide how much e¤ort to exert. Us-
ing this, we derived models of real wage rigidity that resemble the widely-used
models of exogenous wage rigidity in the literature and that can match the large
volatility of unemployment observed in the data. The mechanism for generating
unemployment volatility is the same for both types of model: following a posi-
tive productivity shock, rms post an increased number of vacancies, resulting
in increased labour market tightness and a reduction in unemployment. In re-
sponse to a negative shock, rms post fewer vacancies, resulting in an increase
in unemployment and a reduced marginal cost of hiring, again satisfying (18).
This mechanism is stronger when wage rigidity supresses o¤setting uctuations
in the wage.
In our model, real wage rigidity arises through stickiness of the reference
wage. Recent experimental studies in Behavioural Economics, including Kah-
neman et al (1986), Fehr et al (2009) and Cohn et al (2014), provide some
evidence of this. However we do not as yet have a large body of evidence on
how workers reference wages adjust across the business cycle. Hopefully, ev-
idence on this will emerge, allowing us to determine which of the alternative
models of endogenous real wage rigidity proposed in this paper is best able to
explain the volatility of unemployment.
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